Abstract. In this paper, we consider the problem of predicate encryption and focus on the predicate for testing whether the hamming distance between the attribute X of a data item and a target V is equal to (or less than) a threshold t where X and V are of length m. Existing solutions either do not provide attribute protection or produce a big ciphertext of size O(m2 m ). For the equality version of the problem, we provide a scheme which is match-concealing (MC) secure and the sizes of the ciphertext and token are both O(m). For the inequality version of the problem, we give two practical schemes. The first one, also achieving MC security, produces ciphertext with size O(m tmax ) if the maximum value of t, tmax, is known in advance and is a constant. We also show how to update the ciphertext if the user wants to increase tmax without constructing the ciphertext from scratch. On the other hand, in many real applications, the security requirement can be lowered from MC to MR (match-revealing). Our second scheme, which is MR secure, produces ciphertext of size O(m) and token of size O((t + 1)m) only.
Introduction
It is getting more popular for a data owner to take advantage of the storage and computing resources of a data center to hold the data in encrypted form. Users will be given a token (by the owner) to access the data so that only authorized records can be retrieved and later be decrypted on the user site. Due to the privacy and security concern, it is obvious that the data will not be decrypted at the data center and checked against the criteria one by one. Thus computation is required to be carried out on encrypted data directly. Examples are retrieval of encrypted documents based on keyword matching, selection of encrypted audit logs using multi-dimensional range query on authorized IP addresses or port numbers, and hamming distance based similarity search on encrypted DNA sequence data. The problem, in fact, has received much attention from both database community [16, 3, 17, 13, 18, 27] and cryptography community [26, 4, 24, 10, 19] .
In general, the problem can be stated as follows. For each data item M , there is an associated attribute value X (X may not be part of the record M ) and let f : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} be a predicate which represents the computation we want to carried out on ciphertexts such that the data item M can be successfully decrypted if and only if f (X) = 1. Authorized users will obtain a token generated by the owner in order to perform the predicate evaluation. The predicate can take additional parameters, so a different token can be generated for a different parameter value which increases the flexibility of the data owner to provide different access power to different users. Here is an example. Each medicate record (M ) is encrypted along with a selected region of the DNA sequence (X) of the person. When a research team is authorized to investigate the relationship between a certain DNA sequence V with diseases, this team would acquire a token which corresponds to the predicate f such that f (X) = 1 if and only if HammingDist(X, V ) ≤ t, say t = 5. By using the token, the research team would decrypt all medicate records for which the corresponding DNA sequence is similar to V . In the above motivating example, it is obvious that the research team should not infer any information on records for which the corresponding attribute X which is far away from V (i.e. HammingDist(X, V ) > 5) since they are not authorized to do so. And it is desirable that the ciphertext E(pk, I, M), where pk is the public key generated by the data owner, is the same for different V and t values such that the encryption of data items needs only to be done once. This emerging branch of encryption schemes are referred as predicate encryption.
Here we focus on the predicate f that tests whether the hamming distance between V and X is equal to (or less than) a certain threshold t, where V and X can be assumed as bit vectors of equal length m. Similarity search based on hamming distance 1 is an important searching criterion for record retrieval. This leads to many interesting applications in databases, bioinformatics, and other areas. Note that V and t can vary and will be given to the owner for the generation of a token independent of the ciphertext E(pk, I, M).
The security of predicate encryption [19] can be classified into (1) protecting the data item only; and (2) protecting both the data item and attributes. Attribute protection is usually referred as anonymous in general and can be further classified into two levels: match-revealing (MR) [24] and match-concealing 2 (MC) [10, 19] . The difference between MR and MC is that attributes will remain hidden in MC level even if it satisfies the predicate. While in MR level, if attribute X satisfies the predicate f (i.e. f (X) = 1), some more information on X other than the information of f (X) = 1 can be leaked. In our "medicate record" example, we sometimes require the encryption scheme to be anonymous such that the DNA sequence is protected. In such cases, for example, DNA sequence may contain genetic disorder information which should be kept private for individuals. It depends on applications whether we require MC or MR level of security. For example, if attribute X is part of data item M , when X satisfies the predicate, data item M will be properly decrypted and therefore people can see the entire X (this is allowed by that application semantics). In such case, MR security seems to be a proper choice. So far, the predicate encryption scheme supporting this predicate is the one in [25] , called "Fuzzy Identity-Based Encryption". However, it does not provide the property of anonymity (i.e., attribute protection). In this paper, we propose "anonymous fuzzy identity-based encryption" schemes to handle both the equality threshold and the inequality threshold (less than or equal to) versions of the predicate.
It is not trivial how to make the scheme in [25] anonymous. On the other hand, there is a generic solution [10] (see Appendix A) that can support the predicate we study with the property of anonymity and is MC secure. Their scheme provides a general construction to support any polynomial computable predicate. However, their scheme embeds (pre-computes for) every possible value of V and t in the ciphertext even for the equality threshold version of the problem (the same applies to the inequality version), thus the size of each ciphertext is O(m2 m ) which is impractical even for moderate m although the token size is constant.
Our contributions
For the equality threshold version, we provide an anonymous fuzzy identitybased encryption scheme achieving the MC level of security with both the sizes of ciphertext and token equal to O(m). The construction is based on an innerproduct encryption scheme in [19] . The core idea is to represent the hamming distance computation as an inner product such that X and V can be separated into the ciphertext and the token, respectively, so that V can be given only when the token is needed to be generated.
For the inequality threshold version, we provide two practical schemes to solve the problem. In many applications (e.g. in bioinformatics applications), t << m. Even assuming that we know the maximum value of t (t max ) in advance and is a constant, the size of the ciphertext produced by the solution based on [10] On the other hand, in many applications (in particular for those where the attribute X is part of the data item M ), we only require the schemes to be MR secure. By lowering the security requirement to MR, we provide another scheme in which the sizes of ciphertext and token are only O(m) and O((t + 1)m), respectively which is attractive for real applications.
Related Works
The predicate that was studied in the very beginning is "exact keyword matching". That is, whether the value hidden by the token is equal to the attribute value hidden in the ciphertext. Schemes that only provide data item security are basically "Identity-Based Encryption" [22, 6] . Schemes protecting both the data item and the attributes were initiated by Song et al. [26] in the private-key setting and by Boneh et al. [5] in the public-key setting. Relationship between [5] and "Anonymous Identity-Based Encryption" [9, 14] was revisited in [1] .
Then, range query as the predicate was also considered. Boneh et al. devised an Augmented Broadcast Encryption [8] which allows checking if the attribute value falls within a range on encrypted data. Their scheme also provides attribute protection. Then, Boneh and Waters [10] extended it to multi-dimensional range query. Shi et al.
[24] devised a more efficient scheme for multi-dimensional range query, but the scheme is MR secure.
The predicate investigated in this paper was initiated by [25] which only protects the data item. This predicate is powerful and has many applications other than those stated in [25] . However, there is no practical scheme supporting this predicate with attribute protection in a public-key setting. Park et al. [21] investigated this problem in the private-key setting and is IND2-CKA secure. Liesdonk [20] also investigated this problem in his master thesis. His scheme is in a public-key setting. However, the scheme requires the threshold value t to be fixed in the setup time.
Our work is using [19] as a framework.
[19] provided schemes for handling predicates represented as inner products. Their formulation of using inner products with bounded disjunction is powerful. We show how to reduce inner products to hamming distance similarity comparison predicate, then derive a slightly different encryption scheme for better performance when considering the inequality case. In our work, we consider the problem of attribute protection in public-key setting. In some applications, people may also want to provide protection to predicate ("the token"), which is inherently unachievable in public-key setting. Note that a predicate encryption supporting inner product in private-key setting has been devised in [23] which can provide predicate privacy.
Paper Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the framework of the encryption scheme, the security models and the hard problem assumption. Section 3 presents the scheme for the equality threshold version (i.e., HammingDist(V, X) = t) of the problem and Section 4 deals with the inequality threshold version (i.e., HammingDist(V, X) ≤ t) of the problem. We conclude the paper in Section 5.
Preliminaries
We assume that the attribute X is represented as a bit vector. The attribute V (referred as the target attribute) provided by the user to generate the token is also a bit vector of the same length as X. In the rest of the paper, for simplicity, we focus on predicate-only encryption, that is, we assume that we only have X without M . So, the scheme will output "1" to indicate the decryption is successful (f (X) = 1) and "0" otherwise. Note that extending solutions for predicate-only encryption to include the data item M can be done easily [19] . Also, there exist applications that we only need to encrypt the attribute X and based on the decryption result to retrieve the corresponding records separately.
Framework
An anonymous fuzzy identity-based encryption scheme Π consists of the following four probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithms.
-Setup(1 n ): On an unary string input 1 n where n is a security parameter, it produces the public-private key pair (pk, sk).
-Encrypt(pk, X): Taking the public key pk and the attribute vector X, it outputs the ciphertext C. -GenTK(pk, sk, V, t): The token generation algorithm takes the public key pk, private key sk, outputs the token T K for the vector V and threshold t.
Given the ciphertext C, the token T K, and the public key pk, it outputs "1" if the hamming distance between the vector X associated with C and the vector V associated with T K is equal to t (is less than or equal to t for the inequality version); "0" otherwise.
Security models
We define MR and MC security in the Selective-ID [12, 10, Setup: Adversary A(1 n ) outputs two possible equal-length vectors X 0 and X 1 to challenger C. The challenger C takes a security parameter n and runs Setup to generate pk and sk. C sends pk to A. Challenge: The challenger C picks a random bit b ∈ {0, 1}, computes and returns
Phase 1: Adversary A may adaptively request polynomially bounded number of tokens ("TK") for any (V i , t i ), with the restriction that t i = HammingDist(V i , X j ) for both j = 0, 1 or t i = HammingDist(V i , X j ) for both j = 0, 1 (for inequality threshold, t i < HammingDist(V i , X j ) for both j = 0, 1 or t i ≥ HammingDist(V i , X j ) for both j = 0, 1). Guess: The adversary A outputs a guess bit b . The advantage Adv
Recall that the only difference between MC and MR security is as follows. MC security requires that adversary A cannot gain more information on attribute X than the value of predicate f (X) even when f (X) = 1. MR security requires this only when f (X) = 0. In a security definition, the above difference is formalized as given X 0 and X 1 , MR security does not allow adversary A to request tokens from the challenger for predicate f such that f (X 0 ) = f (X 1 ) = 1. While in MC security, adversary A can freely request tokens no matter f Setup: Adversary A(1 n ) outputs two possible equal-length vectors X 0 and X 1 . The challenger C takes a security parameter n and runs Setup to generate pk and sk. Challenge: The challenger C picks a random bit b ∈ {0, 1}, computes and returns
Phase 1: Adversary A may adaptively request polynomially bounded number of tokens ("TK") for any (V i , t i ) with the restriction that t i = HammingDist(V i , X j ) for both j = 0, 1 (for inequality threshold, t i < HammingDist(V i , X j ) for both j = 0, 1). Guess: The adversary A outputs a guess bit b . The advantage Adv
The Hard Problem Assumption
The hard problem used in this paper is introduced by [19] and has been shown to "hold in generic bilinear groups of composite order N = pqr as long as finding a non-trivial factor of N is hard".
Let G be a group generator which takes security parameter n as input and (randomly) outputs (p, q, r, G, G T , e), where e : G × G → G T is a bilinear map which can be computed efficiently. We call the group G bilinear group. G and G T are cyclic and share the same composite order N = pqr where p, q and r are three large primes. We also denote G p , G q and G r are the subgroups of G with order of p, q and r separately. Since N = pqr where p, q and r are primes, G p , G q and G r must exist and are cyclic. We define Assumption 1 as follows. 
is negligible in security parameter n, wherē Z is defined as:
Scheme for Equality Threshold
In this section, we describe our scheme for handling the equality threshold version of the hamming distance predicate. Recall that both the target attribute V and the threshold t will only be known when the user wants to obtain a token from the owner and can vary for different users. Therefore, we need to produce ciphertext based on attribute X; a token based on V and t even after X is encrypted. The Test() needs to combine ciphertext and token together to compute hamming distance HammingDist(X, V ). To the best of our knowledge, we are aware that only bilinear map can provide such ability while not too powerful to break the security. Intuitively, given g a and g b , bilinear map combines a and b by computing e(g a , g
More specifically, if we encrypt attribute X as ciphertext C = g f (X) and generate token T K = g y(V,t) for target attribute V and threshold t, by bilinear map, we can construct
. If we can find f (X) and 
a·b where a · b denotes the inner product [19, 7] of a and b.
The core step is to represent the hamming distance (see the following lemma, whose proof is in Appendix D) as an inner product of a·b = f (X)·y(V, t) so that the attribute of the data item X and the target attribute V can be encrypted separately into the ciphertext and token.
Lemma 1. Given two bit vectors X and V of equal length m, HammingDist(X, V ) equals
Encryption scheme in [19] (see Appendix B) allows us generating a ciphertext C based on a = (a 1 , ..., a n ) and a token T K based on b = (b 1 , ..., b n ) such that given C and T K, we can compute e(g, g)
, where s is a random number, which gives 1 GT only when the inner product n i=1 a i b i = 0, or a random number otherwise.
[19] is MC secure for above inner product predicate which allows us devising encryption schemes based on inner product expression which will be also MC secure. To evaluating whether HammingDist(X, V ) = t, according to (11), we can check whether e(g, g)
The details of the scheme are as follows. [1,m] , h 3 and h 4 from G p , and then randomly selects R, {R 1,i , R 2,i } i∈ [1,m] , R 3 and R 4 from G r . It outputs [1,m] ,
The encryption algorithm first randomly selects s, α, β from Z N and {R 1,i , R 2,i } i∈ [1,m] , R 3 , R 4 from G r . Then, it outputs the ciphertext C:
. It randomly selects {r 1,i , r 2,i } i∈ [1,m] , r 3 , r 4 and f 1 , f 2 from Z N . Then, it randomly selects Q and R from G q and G r respectively. It outputs the token T K:
] i∈ [1,m] ,
From above scheme, it is easily shown that the sizes of both ciphertext and token are O(m).
Correctness analysis: Our construction is based on Lemma 1 to express the hamming distance as an inner product and then uses the inner-product encryption in [19] , so the correctness can be guaranteed by the correctness of the inner-product encryption. The details of the correctness proof can be found in Appendix E.
Security analysis: Our encryption scheme can be proved to be MC secure. The proof is based on a reduction as follows. Assume that there exits an adversary A 1 that can win the MC game of our scheme with non-negligible advantage, we can use A 1 as a subroutine to construct an adversary A 2 that can win the MC game of the scheme in [19] with non-negligible advantage: When A 1 outputs two vectors X 0 and X 1 to be challenged, A 2 forwards (X 0 , 1) and (X 1 , 1) to challenger. When A 1 asks for token query for (V, t) to A 2 , since
, A 2 is able to answer the query by asking challenger token query for (1 − 2v 1 , . .., 1 − 2v m , v i − t). We omit the proof in this paper.
Scheme for Inequality Threshold
There is a generic solution for solving the case of inequality threshold by using the idea from [10] which can be shown to be MC secure. The details of this generic solution are given in Appendix A. The ciphertext of this solution is of size O(m2 m ) although the token size is constant which is not practical. In the following, we provide two practical schemes to handle the inequality threshold version.
Scheme with known t max
If we can know the maximum value for the threshold t, t max , in advance, we can have a scheme which is better than the generic solution. 
); when H > t, H(H−1)...(H−t) = 0, Test() will output a random number (still no information is leaked rather than the fact H > t since Test() = 1 GT computationally). Note that although evaluating H(H −1)...(H −t) seems trivial
in performance, it helps to ensure no information can be leaked which is required in MC security level.
Since the formula H(H−1)...(H−t)
where H = x i (1 − 2v i )+ v i contains both information from ciphertext (i.e. knowledge of x i ) and token (i.e. knowledge of v i and t) which cannot be available at the same time, we need to split the formula to these two parts (ciphertext and token). Recall that as we discussed in Section 3, we can split the formula to f (X) and y(V, t) whose inner product f (X) · y(V, t) provides the result for
so that we can find f (X) and y(V, t). We let
where we assume a k (k = 1, ..., t + 1) can be efficiently determined.
Lemma 2. Given attribute
and threshold t, we denote H as the hamming distance HammingDist(X, V ) and define a 0 = 0 and b j (j = 0, ..., t + 1) as
. This is the key idea to our construction for inequality threshold. However, notice that x i ∈ {0, 1}, we would future reduce the number of items in equation (3) 
Where B i is defined as above. The number of items in equation (4) 
Token for v i and t is generated by calling GenKey() with input vector: b = (B 0 , B 1 , ..., B m , B m+1 , ..., B (6)). This allows us further reduce the token size. To do so, we devise an encryption scheme slightly different from [19] such that a is still n-dimensional while b can be any n -dimensional (n ≤ n) and decryption will output "1" if and only if the inner product n i=1 a i b i = 0. We describe this construction as follows:
Then, it randomly selects g p from G p , g q from G q and g r from G r . It also randomly selects {h 1,i , h 2,i } i∈ [1,lmax] from G p , and then randomly selects R, {R 1,i , R 2,i } i∈ [1,lmax] from G r . It outputs
The encryption algorithm first randomly selects s, α, β from Z N and {R 1,i , R 2,i } i∈ [1,lmax] from G r . Then, it outputs ciphertext C: [1,t] and f 1 , f 2 from Z N . Then, it randomly selects Q and R from G q and G r respectively. It outputs token TK:
). If r = 1 GT , it will output 1; otherwise it outputs 0.
Applying the above encryption scheme instead of the original scheme of [19] to (5) and (6), we obtain the final construction. Note that the above scheme also makes our security analysis of the final construction much easier (see Appendix F). The final construction Π 1 is described as follows. 3 , r 4 and f 1 , f 2 from Z N . Then, it randomly selects Q and R from G q and G r respectively. It outputs token T K:
It outputs 1 if r = 1 GT and 0 otherwise, where r =
The size of our ciphertext is still O( 
.(H−t)
. The security of the scheme is stated in Theorem 1 and proved in appendix F.
Theorem 1. Our construction Π 1 in Section 4.1 is Selective-ID secure in the math-concealing model under Assumption 1.
Lastly, to show that it is feasible to compute the coefficients a k (k = 1, ..., t + 1) in (1), we have implemented an algorithm to calculate a k . In fact, it can automatically calculate each non-zero elements of vector b in (6). It is written in C++. For example, with input m = 100 and t = 3, it took about 16 seconds to calculate all elements on an Intel Core 2 Due E6750 2.66GHz CPU platform.
Increasing t max : It may be possible that the user wants to increase t max to T . The following shows the ideal of how to update the ciphertext without producing ciphertext from scratch, provided that the value α, β and s generated in Encrypt() procedure are kept by that user. The main ideal is that, when maximum threshold updates from t max to T , the corresponding vector a in (5) will also need to be updated as:
Recall that when maximum threshold is t max , a contains all items whose degree l ≤ t max + 1; now when maximum threshold becomes T , a should contain items whose degree l ≤ T + 1. Then, we need to produce those items whose degree is within t max + 2 to T + 1, namely x j1 ...x j l where t max + 2 ≤ l ≤ T + 1 and = (a, a ) .
The above update procedure can be shown to be MC-secure. Intuitively, when x 1 , ..., x m in a are determined, all items in a (also in a ) have been determined since they are the multiplication of two or more items in {x 1 , ..., x m }. For any possible t max ≥ 0, a (and therefore a ) contains (x 1 , . .., x m ) for sure. That means all terms including the one to be generated due to the increase in t max has been fixed although they are not computed yet. In other words, an adaptive attack will not work in our construction since it has no way to adaptively modify how the missing items are generated no matter what T it provides. This is the intuitive reason that if the scheme for t max is (selective) MC secure, then the update procedure is still (selective) MC secure. The formal proof and the details of how to perform this update can be found in Appendix H.
Note that in the worst case, t max = m, the size of the ciphertext (and token) becomes O(2 m ). Although it is better than O(m2 m ) for the solution in Appendix A, it is not practical. So, this scheme should be used when t max is small.
Scheme for Inequality Threshold with MR security
In this section, we consider another practical situation in which only a lower security level (the MR security) is required. Recall that the only difference between MC and MR security is that MR security does not require attribute X to be hidden after Test() outputs "1". MR security is still reasonable in many real applications. For example, as we mentioned before, the attribute X may be part of the data item M . When Test(X) = 1, we will properly decrypt M and see the entire X. It is meaningless to require MC security.
In fact, MR security does not define or limit how much information on attribute X can be leaked if Test(X) = 1. That is, we may leak the entire X in an encryption scheme which is still MR secure. This is the key to optimize the performance of such a scheme. We first show a general idea of how to make use of this property. Intuitively, we can decompose the predicate f (and therefore Test(X)) into T cases such that there exist MC-secure (or at least MR-secure) schemes for each case. Then, we can construct an MR secure scheme by encrypting data item M under each encryption scheme for each case. When deriving token, our scheme will generate decryption keys corresponding to those T different cases. If at least one of the cases decrypts successfully, Test() outputs "1". Otherwise, Test() outputs "0".
The above scheme can be shown to be MR secure. Since the scheme for each case is assumed to be at least MR secure, if Test(X) = 0, none of the scheme will leak any information about X except that X does not satisfy the query. In other words, given X 0 and X 1 , it is not way to tell the difference which achieves MR security. On the other hand, if Test(X) = 1, how much information can be deduced depends on how we decompose the cases and what scheme is used in each case. Similarly, for performance, it depends on how we decompose the cases (i.e., the number of cases) and the decryption cost for each case. For example, if Test() is equality threshold t testing of hamming distance, the following shows one approach (not a good approach) to decompose it into cases. There will be Focusing on our construction in this section, we can simply decompose the predicate f of testing whether HammingDist(X, V ) ≤ t to t+1 cases that whether HammingDist(X, V ) = 0, whether HammingDist(X, V ) = 1, ..., and whether HammingDist(X, V ) = t. Such scheme has decryption complexity of O((t + 1) × m) if we use the (MC-secure) construction in Section 3.
Denote the scheme in Section 3 as Π 3 = (Setup , Encrypt , GenTK , Test ), we describe our scheme, Π 4 = (Setup = Setup , Encrypt = Encrypt , GenTK , Test ), with MR security as follows.
-GenTK(pk, sk, V ) : For each j ∈ {0, ..., t}, it runs T K j = GenTK (pk, sk, V, j) and returns
and checks if any of the results for any j is 1 GT , it returns 1, otherwise it returns 0 indicating that HammingDist(X, V ) > t.
The size of the ciphertext in the above scheme is O(m) and the size of the token for threshold t is O((t+1)m).
The correctness of the scheme follows directly from the correctness of the scheme in Section 3. The security of the scheme is given in the following theorem. The formal proof can be found in Appendix G based on a simple reduction (its intuitive ideal has been discussed in the beginning of this section). Recall that the scheme in section 3 is MC secure under Assumption 1.
Theorem 2. Scheme in Section 4.2 is selective-ID secure in match-revealing model if scheme in Section 3 is selective-ID secure in match-concealing model.

Conclusion
In this paper, we investigated the problem of predicate encryption with attribute protection and focus on a hamming distance similarity comparison predicate. We consider both the equality and inequality versions on a user-specific threshold t. For the equality version, we provide a MC-secure scheme with both the sizes of ciphertext and token equal to O(m) where m is the length of the attribute vector. For the inequality version, we provide two practical schemes, one works for the situation when the maximum value of t (t max ) is known and is MC secure.
The other works for applications which require only MR security. The schemes provided in the paper should be applicable to real applications thus allowing the application communities to perform more useful computation on encrypted data.
The sizes of the ciphertext in our MC-secure scheme for the inequality threshold is 
A A generic construction from [10]
The main idea of this construction is that we generate a ciphertext (C 0 , C 1 , ...C tmax ) for each possible V ∈ {0, 1} m where we assume that the vector size is m. For each j ∈ Z tmax+1 , if HammingDist(X, V ) ≤ j, then C j will be an encrypted message for "true" based on an IND-CPA secure encryption scheme; otherwise, C j will be an encrypted message for "false". When we Test() for a certain (V, t), we can simply find the ciphertext for V and decrypt the t-th element C t in that ciphertext. If HammingDist(X, V ) ≤ t, the decryption result should be "true". More specifically, we define the encryption scheme as follows. Let (G, E, D) be an IND-CPA secure encryption scheme.
m times. Return the public-key pk as {pk l,j } {l∈{0,1} m ,j∈Zt max +1} and the secret key sk as {sk l,j } {l∈{0,1} m ,j∈Zt max +1} .
-GenTK(pk, sk, V, t): Return sk V,t as the token.
If r is equal to "true" then return 1; otherwise return 0.
The security of the above solution comes from the IND-CPA secure encryption scheme we used 4 , see appendix A of [10] for more details. We can rearrange the ciphertexts so that C l,j in our solution is corresponding to C (tmax+1)l+j in [10] 's proof and the rest of the proof is the same. We should also note that (t max + 1)2 m should be poly(n) in security parameter n because all algorithms given above should be polynomial-time.
B Predicate-only encryption in [19]
[19] proposes a predicate encryption scheme for inner product predicate. Below we describe its predicate-only version used in this paper for completeness. The scheme consists of (Setup, Enc, GenKey, Dec):
The setup algorithm first runs G(1 n ) to obtain (p, q, r, G, G T , e). Next, it computes g p , g q and g r as generators of G p , G q and G r , respectively. It then chooses R 1,i , R 2,i ∈ G r and h 1,i , h 2,i ∈ G p uniformly at random for i = 1 to n, and R 0 ∈ G r uniformly at random. The public parameters include (N = pqr, G, G T , e) along with:
).
n). It outputs the ciphertext
-GenKey(SK, v):
). This algorithm chooses random r 1,i , r 2,i ∈ Z p for i = 1 to n, random R 5 ∈ G r , random f 1 , f 2 ∈ Z q and random Q 6 ∈ G q . It then outputs
) be as above. The decryption algorithm outputs 1 if and only if
C Proof of Lemma 2
By Binomial theorem, we have
If we substitute equation (8) for each H k (k = 1, ..., t + 1) in (1), we have
Focusing on each ( (9), by applying Multinomial theorem, we have
(10) We substitute (10) in equation (9), which completes the proof.
D Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Since X = x 1 , ..., v i , ..., x m and V = v 1 , ..., v i , . .., v m are bit vectors, their hamming distance are equal to the summation of exclusive-or ("⊕") at each position i. Keep in mind that we want to represent hamming distance in inner product form and therefore we use the formula that
Since the number of items will heavily impact on sizes of ciphertext, token and decryption cost, we also want the number can be as small as possible. This motivates us to represent
The details are as follows.
E Correctness analysis of the scheme for equality threshold
One key property behind the scheme in [19] is that if two elements a and b come from two different (prime) subgroups of G, then e(a, b) = 1 GT . To simplify our correctness analysis, since the token of encryption scheme in Section 3 only involves elements from G p and G q , we investigate the value of r = Test(pk, T K, C) in subgroup G p and G q respectively only. Proof. This proof is by contradiction. We will show that if there exist Adversary A 1 with non-negligible adversary with our construction Π 1 , then we can construct an Adversary A 2 also with non-negligible with scheme Π 2 under definition 4. 
where we denote r 2,i = af 2 v i + r 2,i and f 2 =f 2 .
. It outputs pk to adversary:
The challenging ciphertext C * is generated as follows: challenger C first randomly select R 1,i and R 2,i from G r .
When receiving V = v 1 ...v i ...v t from adversary A, the challenger C generates corresponding token as follows. According to Definition 4, V should be subject to (i)
We handle token generation in this two conditions separately.
The same as the original algorithm.
Then, we also need to define a proper security definition concerning t max updates. Proof. The above theorem is proved in two steps. We first modify the innerproduct encryption defined in Section 4.1 to a scheme Π I supporting ciphertext updates. Similar to the method in Lemma 3, we prove in Lemma 5 that if this modified inner-product encryption scheme Π I is Selective-ID secure in matchconcealing mode with t max update capability, then, the encryption scheme Π H = (Setup, Encrypt, UpdateCipher, GenTK, Test) defined here is also Selective-ID secure in match-concealing mode with t max update capability.
The second step is that we prove this modified inner-product encryption scheme Π I is Selective-ID secure in match-concealing mode with t max update if inner-product encryption scheme Π 2 defined in Section 4.1 is MC secure (Definition 4 and Lemma 4). It is proved by Lemma 6.
To prove the first stage, we first describe the modified inner-product encryption scheme which also consists of five PPT algorithms Π I = (Setup, Encrypt, UpdateCipher, GenTK, Test):
. Then, it randomly selects g p from G p , g q from G q and g r from G r . It also randomly selects {h 1,i , h 2,i } i∈ [1, Lmax] from G p , and then randomly selects R, {R 1,i , R 2,i } i∈ [1, Lmax] from G r . It outputs L max and a description of a deterministic function
(This pre-defined function restricts adversary cannot adaptively updates ciphertext.) It also outputs public key pk and secret key sk:
We define its security definition as follows. Setup: The adversary A(1 n ) outputs two possible equal-length (l max -length) vectors X 0 and X 1 . The challenger C takes a security parameter n and runs Setup to generate pk and sk. C sends pk to A. Setup also outputs L max = poly(n) and function g().
Challenge: The challenger picks a random bit b ∈ {0, 1}, computes (C * , S * ) Then, we prove Lemma 6 to complete the proof for Theorem 3. , 0, X 1 ) .
The challenger C takes a security parameter n and runs Setup to generate pk and sk (for L max -length). C returns pk to adversary A 2 (1 n ). The adversary A 2 passes pk to A 1 . Challenge: The challenger C picks a random bit b ∈ {0, 1}, computes and returns 
